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INVOKING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT
REBUILDING: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL*

INTRODUCTION

Establishing the rule of law is increasingly seen as the panacea
for all the problems that afflict many non-Western countries,
particularly in post-conflict settings.' Development experts
* Ford International Associate Professor of Law and Development and Director,
Program on Human Rights and Justice, MIT; former Human Rights Officer, United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Cambodia. I thank Lan Cao, Robert Post, Vicki
Jackson, and Jane Stromseth for a great set of intellectual exchanges during and after a
symposium panel at the William & Mary School of Law, where this Article was presented.
I also wish to thank the editors of the William and Mary Law Review for their assistance.
A slightly shorter version of this Article is forthcoming in CIVIL WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW:
SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS (Agn~s Hurwitz, with Reyko Huang, eds., 2008).

1. This belief is evidenced in a plethora of official reports, articles and books in recent
years. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General:In LargerFreedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,
133-39, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A159/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom];
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, Dec. 2, 2004, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, 7 145-48, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 [hereinafter A More Secure World]; The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General:Road Map Towards the Implementation
of the United Nations Millennium Declaration,$ 14-32, delivered to the GeneralAssembly,
U.N. Doc. A/56/326 (Sept. 6, 2001); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General:
The Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, IT 2-4,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter
TransitionalJustice];THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OFLAWABROAD: IN SEARCH
OF KNOWLEDGE (2006) [hereinafter PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW]; JANE STROMSETH ET AL.,
CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
(2006); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006)
[hereinafter MEANS TO AN END]; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (2004) [hereinafter ON THE RULE OF LAW]; AGNtS HURWITZ & KAYSIE
STUDDARD, INT'L PEACE ACAD., RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS IN PEACE OPERATIONS 3 (2005),

availableat http://www. ipacademy.org/pdfs/IPA_E_REPORT_RULE_ OF_LAW.pdf.; Kirsti
Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-ConflictCountries:OperationalInitiativesand Lessons
Learnt (Soc. Dev. Dep't of the World Bank, Social Development Paper No. 37, 2006). For a
general overview of rule of law in post-conflict settings, see David Tolbert with Andrew
Solomon, UnitedNations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies,
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prescribe it as the surest shortcut to market-led growth; human
rights groups advocate the rule of law as the best defense against
human rights abuses; and, in the area of peace and security, the
rule of law is considered the surest guarantee against the
reemergence of conflicts and the basis for rebuilding post-conflict
societies. Indeed, the rule of law has occupied this central position
at least since the early 1990s, as Thomas Carothers recognized in
a well-known article on the revival of the rule of law some years
ago.2 Therefore, in a very direct sense, the rule of law has come to
be considered the common element that development experts,
security analysts, and human rights activists agree upon, and as
the mechanism that links these disparate areas. Constitution
making is also seen as a cornerstone of rule of law activities in postconflict settings,3 but this Article focuses more on the diverse policy
background against which legal reform is sought to be carried out
and justified in "everyday" politics, and much less on constitution
making, as such.

19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29 (2006). "Transitional justice" is an allied strand of literature that
covers a substantial amount of the ground covered by rule of law literature. See, e.g., RUTI
G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
2. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 95-106 (1998)
(discussing why the rule of law is receiving a lot of recent attention, and that it is not a new
idea); see also THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACYABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 157206 (1999).
3. See, for example, the contributions of Vicki Jackson and Jane Stromseth in this
volume. Vicki Jackson, What's in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming,and ConstitutionMaking, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249 (2008); Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law
Building: The Need for a Multi-Layered,SynergisticApproach, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443
(2008). The most extensive and thoughtful literature on constitution making and its impact
on rule of law has emerged from the experience of East and Central Europe after the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the former Soviet Union, which, in turn, led to the
formation of many new countries with their own constitutions and courts. See generallyAntal
(rkdny & Kim Lane Scheppele, Rules of Law: The Complexity of Legality in Hungary, in THE
RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 55
(Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999); see also generally THE RULE OF LAW IN
CENTRAL EUROPE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGALITY, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CIVIL
SOCIETY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (Jiri Pribai & James Young eds., 1999);
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE (2000); Kim Lane Scheppele, Guardiansof the Constitution: Constitutional Court
Presidentsand the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1757 (2006).
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This Article argues that this newfound fascination with the rule
of law is misplaced. Underlying this "linkage" idea is a desire to
escape from politics by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal,
and apolitical. In other words, there is a tendency to think that
failures of development, threats to security, and human rights
violations could all be avoided or managed by a resort to law. This
Article traces the characteristics of this idea and the different
strands of policy and disciplinary discourses that have led to this
conclusion, and argues that there is, in fact, a need to retain politics
at the center of the discussions of development, human rights, and
security. In addition, it argues that the invocation of the rule of law
hides many contradictions among the different policy agendas
themselves, such as between development and human rights or
between security and human rights, that cannot be fully resolved
by invoking the rule of law as a mantra. It is far more important to
inquire into the real consequences of these agendas on ordinary
people. Focusing attention on the rule of law as a broad, if not lofty,
concept diverts attention from the coherence, effectiveness, and
legitimacy of specific policies that are pursued to ensure security,
promote development, or protect human rights. The rule of law
agenda threatens to obfuscate the real tradeoffs that need to be
made in order to achieve these worthy goals. These tradeoffs are
real, partly due to the contradictions of socioeconomic development
and political necessities in post-conflict settings and partly due to
the contradictions between powerful third-party external actors
with their own agendas and expert discourses who seek to intervene
during "constitutional moments"' of post-conflict reconstruction in
the Third World.
The post-Cold War "consensus" on the rule of law must be seen
against the background of two well-known, macro-level developments. First, an increasing number of intra-state conflicts around
the world have led to concerns of state failure, prompting new
generations of peace operations sanctioned by the United Nations
(UN) Security Council,5 as well as situations of classic military
occupations, such as the ongoing situation in Iraq. Second, the
4. See generally Jackson, supranote 3.
5. See TransitionalJustice, supra note 1,

11-12.
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structurally violent and divisive nature of neoliberal development
interventions has resulted in human rights violations and other
social costs through such devices as the privatization of key
national industries that increase unemployment, speculative
bubbles in international finance transactions that have massive
impacts on real estate and housing markets, mass population
displacement and urban migration, the elimination of subsidies for
food and services, and the introduction of user fees for infrastructure.6 Against this background, the relationship between the
disparate agendas of development, security, and human rights
cannot be underestimated, and the invocation of the rule of law will
not substitute for an honest evaluation of the costs and benefits of
different policies, norms, and institutions.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I traces the historical
origins of the links among security, development, and human rights
discourses since World War II and identifies some recurring
themes, despite real differences among them. Part I also points out
the ways in which the lines among these discourses began blurring
since the 1970s and during the post-Cold War period, especially in
the context of peace operations. Part II discusses the convergence
between the human rights and rule of law discourses in the postCold War period, but also points out the continuing differences
between the two. Part III examines the meaning of the rule of law
in the context of development and finds that the rule of law is no
substitute for human rights. Part III also questions whether the
rule of law is even a key requirement for successful economic
growth. Part IV examines the meaning of the rule of law in the
context of security and finds that reliance on this concept cannot
hide the more fundamental question of legitimacy in the post-9/11
world. In the field of security, it would not be prudent to lessen the
reliance on the discourse of human rights for the fuzzier discourse
on the rule of law. The Conclusion then offers some reflections on
the lessons that have been learned about how best to capture the
synergy that may exist between different fields of international

6. See CTR. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR SOCIAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (2006), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
CGG/UNPAN026197.pdf.
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interventions in the security, development, and human rights policy
domains.
I. SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS AND
NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP

The discourses of security, development, and human rights have
diverse origins, but multiple, often unrecognized, intersections.
Briefly put, the discourse of security emerged from the realist
critiques of international relations.7 Influenced by scholars such as
Hans Morgenthau, it was primarily conceived in statist terms and
was focused on managing the conflicts that arose between nationstates.8 This notion of security was predominant during the Cold
War, when threats to the inter-state system were perceived to be
severe.9 The security studies scholarship of this period was
correspondingly dominated by political scientists who began by
acknowledging the centrality of the doctrine of national security. 10
The discourse of development, which has been much contested
since its emergence in the 1940s, had its origin in colonial rule,
development economics, and political development theory; it
focused on the economic growth of "new" nation-states after
decolonization. 1 Largely utilitarian in its calculus, the discipline of
development tended to focus on measurement of aggregate indices
12
of welfare, drawing on national income estimates from the 1940s.

7. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3-17 (6th ed. 1985).

8. See id. at 451-57.
9. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 92 (2005); Robert Jervis,

Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?, 3 J. COLD WAR STUD. 36, 59 (2001).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MATTHEW & LEAH FRASER, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE & HUMAN
SEC. PROGRAM OFFICE, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN
SECURITY: CONCEPTUALAND THEORETICALISSUES 5 (2002), availableat http://www.gechs.uci.

edu/gechsprdraffinal.pdf.
11. See ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 22 (1994); WOLFGANG SACHS, THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE
TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER (1992). See generallyHA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).
12. See ESCOBAR, supra note 11, at 23-24; BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 108
(2003).
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As can be readily seen, the discourses on security and development were natural allies. Both discourses relied heavily on the
notion of the territorial nation-state and drew their force from their
ability to supply content to aspects of nationalism, both territorial
and developmental. The welfare of individuals, or of sub-state
entities, did not figure prominently in the study of either security
or development." In addition, the two discourses were also linked
from the beginning for different reasons. Development interventions tended to be seen by Western leaders as one of the best tools
available to fight the communist menace, offering incentives for
restive rural peasant populations not to rebel, while cementing the
patron-client relationships between friendly regimes in power and
their key domestic constituencies. 4 As U.S. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles stated in 1956, "We are in a contest in the field of
economic development of underdeveloped countries ....
Defeat ...
could be as disastrous as defeat in the armaments race."'" When
radical communist movements swept to power in several Third
World states during the 1950s, the response by the West was swift;
the iron fist of repression and foreign intervention was brought
down heavily on these countries, while the velvet glove of development was applied to pacify the restive rural masses. 16 For example,
these events forced the demotion of Latin America by the United
States to an "underdeveloped area," from its pre-war status as a
region with a range of "developing" economies, in order to justify its
foreign assistance and, therefore, security rationale. 7 Indeed, the
different paradigm shifts in development discourse-for example,
from growth with redistribution to poverty alleviation and basic
needs in the 1970s-were explicable by the proxy wars in the Third
World between the Cold War blocs.'" The "war on poverty" an13. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protectionof the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussing the evolution of
protecting individual rights under international human rights law).
14. See GADDIS, supra note 9, at 95-98.
15. Transcript of Dulles News Conference on Economic Contest with Soviet Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1956, at 10.
16. See ODD ARNE WESTAD, THE GLOBAL COLD WAR: THIRD WORLD INTERVENTIONS AND
THE MAKING OF OUR TIMES 111-12, 119 (2005).
17. 1 DEVESH KAPR, JOHN P. LEWIS & RICHARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF
CENTURY 143 (1997).
18. For a discussion, see id. at 215-68.
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nounced by Robert McNamara at the World Bank in 1973 had a
distinct security rationale to it. 9 Political development theorists
provided theoretical support for this by justifying the importance of
political stability and repression for economic growth to prevent the
countries concerned from falling to the communists.2 ° This focus on
the linkage between security and development continues to this
day, as demonstrated by the emphasis on development in the
most recently published U.S. National Security Strategy, released
in 2002, though with a focus on "failing' states and "the embittered
few" rather than the communists. 2 ' Thus, the language has
changed, but not the rationale.
The emergence of the human rights discourse did not fundamentally threaten this symbiotic relationship, at least not at first.
Conceived as a set of state obligations towards citizens, the human
rights system fit easily into the nation-state focused world of
security and development.2 2 The system of human rights did not
pose any radical challenges to the state-centric world order, such as
by pushing for extra-national obligations of states or obligations of
non-state actors, and reaffirmed the same goals that development
and security regimes set for themselves.2 3 To the extent that there
appeared to be any contradictions, human rights law provided
for exemptions within the terms of the treaties themselves. For
example, the law itself allowed violations, where needed, to preserve political stability through the concept of public emergency laid
down under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).24 Economic and social rights were
conceived of in promotional terms under the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which did not
seriously threaten the dominant role of the state in the economy by
imposing legal limits on the state's ability to guide economic
19. See id. at 219-23.
20. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 374-78 (1968).
21. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 1 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGY], availableat http://www.white
house.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
22. See Sohn, supra note 13, at 9.
23. See id.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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development.2 5 Many states in the West, especially European
nations and the newly independent Third World countries, widely
subscribed to this position during the 1960s.26 Given the largely
voluntarist premises of international human rights law,27 states
could choose to undertake limited obligations that they were
comfortable with. Despite this compatibility, the human rights
discourse remained largely isolated from the discourses of security
and development until the 1970s and was largely dominated by
lawyers.2"
Significant changes since the 1970s began blurring the lines
among the discourses of development, security, and human rights.
The story of the relationship between development and human
rights is well-chronicled elsewhere,2 9 but the following key developments in that relationship should be noted:
• The expansion of the notion of development to include human
development measures at the level of the family and the
household, chiefly evidenced through UNDP reports;"
" The emergence of the language of social progress and development from the Declaration of Tehran (1967) and culminating
in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Right to Development in 1986. This move followed two decades of attempts by
Third World countries to elevate development as an international legal norm that would impose legal obligations on rich
countries, both to abstain from intervening in Third World
developmental strategies, such as the pursuit of an industrial
31
policy, and to provide more development assistance;

25. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 6, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
26. Farroukh Jhabvala, On Human Rights and the Socio-Economic Context, in THIRD
WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (Frederick Snyder & Surakiart
Sathirathai eds., 1987).
27. See, e.g., The Third Comm., Report of the Third Committee on Human Rights
Questions: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the

Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom,
A/56/583/Add.2 (Dec. 11, 2001) (preparedby Juraj Priputen).
28. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 216-18.
29. See, e.g., id. at 171-232.
30. See id. at 222-24.
31. See id. at 216-22.

4-15, U.N. Doc.
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" The emergence of the governance agenda in development
policy since the late 1980s, focusing attention on governmental failures as the reason behind developmental failures.
Arising from the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa, this
move saw the failure of development as the result of the
absence of adequate institutions, both political and economic. At issue was the lack of transparency and accountability of government. This contrasted with the early
explanations for the failure of development, which had
focused on the absence of the right capital and prices and
the absence of an appropriate policy framework for economic
growth. This new focus on governance--or good governance
in the literature of the World Bank-neatly coincided with
the rise of the institutionalist turn in development economics, which came to see the legal frameworks of property and
contracts as the source of economic growth. This newfound
interest in institutions and legal norms had the effect of
bringing human rights, which also focused primarily on
legal reform, closer to development;3 2
" The emergence of rights-based approaches to development
since the 1990s in multilateral and bilateral development
agencies, combined with a new interest in economic, social,
and cultural rights. The move towards a rights-based
approach was driven by a paradigm shift within development that began to see development itself as freedom, while
retaining a belief that such a new paradigm could lead to
changes at the project level, where development is "delivered" to its beneficiaries. The new interest in economic and
social rights was driven in large part by the constitutionalization and judicialization of these rights, as part of a
wave of democratic transitions and constitution making
across the world; 3
* High-profile global campaigns involving civil society actors
in various countries around the issues of displacement and
damage to the environment in countries like Brazil and
32. See id. at 218, 224-25; KAPUR ETAL., supra note 17, at 532-33.
33. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 217-32.
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India, which led, in turn, to the adoption of better standards
by the World Bank on internal displacement and respect for
indigenous peoples' rights during the 1980s and to the
establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel in the
early 1990s. These mobilizations, which were simultaneously global and local, provided the political background
to the move to bring human rights and development closer.34
The discourse of security, too, began to change. First, it was
expanded to include understandings of environmental security,
focusing attention on environmental damage as the cause and
consequence of violent conflicts, including conflicts relating to
natural resources.35 The traditional notion of security was also
increasingly challenged by new notions of human security, which
emphasized the security of human beings over states.36 Second, the
notion of international security was expanded to include intra-state
conflicts, which were proliferating rapidly after the end of the Cold
War.37 As the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty noted, the changing nature of armed
conflict in the world was reflected by the fact that 90 percent of
people killed in armed conflicts in the late twentieth century were
civilians, whereas it had been only one out of ten at the beginning
of the twentieth century.3" Third, the source of threats to world
order had also been seen to change from classic state-based threats
to non-state threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, and
transnational organized crime.3" This expanded understanding of
34. See id. at 245-63.
35. There is a very rich and complex literature on environmental security. A good source
is the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.orgindex.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&
topicid=1413 (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). For two recent samples of the literature, see
ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEMAKING (Ken Conca & Geoffrey D. Dabelko eds., 2002) and VIOLENT
ENVIRONMENTS (Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts eds., 2001).
36. See, e.g., OSITA AGBU, WEST AFRICA'S TROUBLE SPOTS AND THE IMPERATIVE FOR
PEACE-BUILDING 3-5 (2006).
37. Andrea Strimling, The Federal Mediation and ConciliationService: A Partner in
InternationalConflict Prevention, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 417, 419 (2002).
38. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE RESPONSIBILITY To
PROTECT 13 (2001).
39. See generally RAPHAEL PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORISM AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS (Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/
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security shared many common elements with the most evolved
thinking in development, which together indicated that the older
consensus on the development-security linkage had broken down
and been replaced with a new one, which had human rights at its
core.
This was problematic, however. The language of human rights
had since then been appropriated as part of numerous peoples'
struggles around the world, and it could not so readily be deployed
as a tool of governance in the fields of development or security.4 ° In
other words, development and security experts were working with
relatively conflict-free notions of human rights that could be used
to program activities in their respective fields, and this proved to be
a problem. For every attempt to engage in "rights talk" by a development agency, a local actor such as a non-governmental organization (NGO) or a social movement would offer an oppositional
reading of rights.4 ' Rights discourse is, in fact, constantly appropriated for oppositional struggles,4 2 which makes it a particularly
difficult device for governance strategies. For example, the World
Commission on Dams attempted to build a new set of prescriptions
for better dam building based on a human rights-influenced "rights
and risks" approach.4 For large dam-building states like India and
China, this attempt to use human rights as a basis of governance
proved to be too discomforting and they ended up rejecting the
report of the Commission.4 4 However, for the NGOs and social
movements of the people displaced by dams, the "rights and risks"
IB10119.pdf (examining international terrorism and the U.S. policy response); JOHN R.
WAGLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: PRINCIPAL THREATS
AND U.S. RESPONSES (Mar. 20, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33335.pdf (examining the growing threat of transnational organized crime to national and
global security).
40. See Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions,Development, and Justice: The Trial of Hissein
Habrg, 16 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 147, 161-65 (2003) (discussing the differences between human
rights and development discourses).
41. See Henry J. Steiner, The University's CriticalRole in the Human Rights Movement,
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 317, 319 (2002); Joel P. Trachtman, Welcome to Cosmopolis, World of
Boundless Opportunity, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 779, 787 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 41, at 319.
43. WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING 197-211 (2000), availableat http://www.dams.org/docs/report/wcdch7.pdf
[hereinafter DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT].
44. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 219.
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approach provided a minimal political safeguard that their interests
would be taken into account. 45 This counter-hegemonic function
of rights, as it has been called elsewhere,46 proved sufficiently
problematic for the fields of development and security. Thus, the
links with the human rights discourse may, as a result, be in the
process of being replaced with another, more malleable, discourse
on the rule of law, as will be elaborated below. The relationship
between development, security, and human rights had become
confusingly self-referential and circular, each discourse pointing to
the other as either the precondition for its own success or the
reason for its failure. Notions such as human development and
human security also muddied the waters by often equating their
meaning to the full achievement of human rights, without being
clear about how each is distinct.4 7
For now, it should be noted that the new post-Cold War consensus on development, security, and human rights could be said to
have the following characteristics. First, there has been a move
away from the nation-state as the focus of development towards the
individuals and various subgroups (women, children, small farmers,
etc.) living within it. Second, state failure is regarded as responsible
for common and grave challenges in the fields of security, development, and human rights and, therefore, saving "failed states" is
seen as a priority for the international community. Third, there has
been a corresponding redefinition of sovereignty from that of a right
of a state to exclusive domestic control, to a responsibility of a state
to protect its citizens. Finally, there is now a focus on the rule of
law as the tool that will help achieve the goals of development,
security, and human rights.

45. DAMs AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, at 207.
46. See RAJAGOPAL, supranote 12 at 245-58; see also Balakrishnan Rajagopal, CounterHegemonicInternationalLaw: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World
Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q., 767, 767 (2006).
47. See, e.g., COMM'N ON HUMAN SEC., HUMAN SECURITY Now 11-12 (2003) [hereinafter
HUMAN SECURITY NOW]; U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at 127

(2000).
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: CONCEPTUAL
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?

The new focus on human rights in the fields of development and
security was proving to be rather uncertain for the reasons I
advanced above, including the open-ended nature of human rights
and their use by opposing actors, the persisting tensions and
tradeoffs between the goals of development, security, and human
rights, and the circular, self-referential nature of the convergence
between the three discourses. While it was clear that development
needed to transform itself from macro-level aggregates of human
welfare, computed according to a utilitarian calculus, to focus on
individuals, voice, and accountability, the language of human rights
was proving to be highly contentious as a means towards that end.
Similarly, while it was clear that traditional state-based notions of
security were unhelpful, the notion of human security was proving
difficult to realize, partly because it did not seem to have an agreed
upon core of meaning and often simply came to mean a respect for
human rights.
The rule of law came to be seen, in many ways, as a convenient
substitute for human rights. Unlike human rights, the rule of law
does not promise the achievement of any substantive social,
political, or cultural goal. It is much more empty of content and
capable of being interpreted in many diverse, sometimes contradictory, ways. The human rights discourse is a discourse of social
transformation, and even emancipation, whereas the rule of law
discourse does not have that ambition and may be seen as inherently conservative. This is largely, but not only, due to the association of the rule of law with a culture of law and order of the state,
whereas the human rights discourse has conventionally been seen
as articulating the entitlements of individuals and groups to be free
from violence of various types.4" Especially in its non-legal forms,
the human rights discourse is a powerful tool for social change

48. See, e.g., PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 130 (discussing an
instrumental understanding of the rule of law); Sharp, supra note 40, at 61-65 (discussing
the differences between human rights and development discourse).
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due to its normative commitment. 49 By contrast, the rule of law

discourse is far more compatible with the discourse of development,
which retained its aversion to normative talk due to its roots in
economics.5" Besides, since the 1980s, an important part of the
development discourse had come to emphasize the importance of
institutions, including legal norms, for achieving economic growth.5
Known as the "new institutionalists," these economic historians and
rational choice institutionalists increasingly pointed to the importance of property rights, contract rights, and an independent and
impartial judiciary for achieving economic growth.52 This had a
major impact on development policy53 and practice and led to an
exponential increase in the resources available for rule of law
programming. More importantly, the role of legal norms and
institutions, both formal and informal, became much more central
to the development discourse,5 4 and the rule of law became almost
a "trope" for the many different things that the new institutionalists thought law could do to foster development. The rule of
law discourse was also much more compatible with this strand of
development theory, with its more neutral focus on formal
realizability, the supremacy of law, and the emphasis on process.55
Despite the seminal work of Amartya Sen56 and the significant
efforts to mainstream it within the development discourse,57 the

49. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 230.

50. See id.
51. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 107-40 (1990).
52. See id. at 138-40; THE WoRLD BANK, WoRLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 4-5 (2002) [hereinafter BUILDING INSTITUTIONS]; Christopher

Clague et al., Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights and Contract
Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN
LESS DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 68-70 (Christopher Clague ed., 1997).
53. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
IN THE WESTAND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 62-66 (2000); BUILDING INSTITUTIONS, supranote
52, at 99-100.
54. See, e.g., ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 1-3.

55. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsideringthe Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781,795-97
(1989) (arguing that traditional rule of law theory rests on the concept of formal realizability,
which should be changed).
56. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
57. For a discussion, see RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 216-32.
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human rights discourse has never been obviously compatible with
conventional development approaches.
Yet, in recent years the rule of law and human rights have been
used in conjunction, as if they were inseparable.5 8 Alternatively, an
expanded understanding of the rule of law is also being used which
encompasses some notions of "rights" or "justice." 9 Throughout the
1990s, one could see this tendency in the field of security, especially
in the area of peacebuilding.6 ° In the development realm, this
expanded approach to the rule of law could be seen in the rhetoric
of the World Bank. In a 2002 policy document, it states that "the
rule of law prevails where (i) the government itself is bound by the
law, (ii) every person in society is treated equally under the law,
(iii) the human dignity of each individual is recognized and
protected by law, and (iv) justice is accessible to all."'"
However, this ostensible convergence between the rule of law and
human rights is more apparent than real. Historically, the connection between the human rights discourse and the rule of law was
relatively tenuous. Despite the reference to the rule of law in the
preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),62
the relationship between the rule of law and human rights has been
unclear and is, in fact, one of the least analyzed from a theoretical
perspective. In fact, the notion of the rule of law was fundamentally
challenged after the experience of the Nazi regime, which was,
after all, a regime based on a fairly scrupulous commitment to legal
rules and administrative regulations.6" Despite the seminal
German contribution to the rule of law since the nineteenth
58. See, e.g., Jackson Maogato & Benedict Sheehy, Torturingthe Rule of Law: USA and
the Post 9-11 Legal World, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 689, 689-91 (2007).
59. See, e.g., Tolbert, supra note 1, at 32, 42, 51.
60. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Keeping Operations,delivered to the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc.
A/55/305-5/2000/809 (Aug. 21,2004); BOUTROSBOUTROS-GHALI, ANAGENDAFORPEACE: 1995
(2d ed. 1995).
61. THE WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIENCES, AND
APPROACH OF THE LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY 1 (2002).
62. 'Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected
by the rule of law ..." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
63. ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 108.
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century, including through the concept of Rechtstaat,6 4 the idea that
the rule of law could prevent barbarities was discredited after the
Nazi experience. The human rights discourse in fact reflects this
ambivalence. The UDHR itself invokes the rule of law only as a
defensive mechanism against self-help and mob justice, but not as
a precondition or necessity for the realization of human rights.6 5
There is, in fact, no general right of access to, or enjoyment of, the
rule of law in international human rights law. The human rights
covenants do not require that human rights should, under all
circumstances, be guaranteed only through law, but only that law
is one of many other "measures" that may be necessary to realize
rights.6 6 At the core of this debate is a larger jurisprudential
question, which has divided scholars since the Nazi atrocities, as to
whether the rule of law has a moral core or not.67 Given this
complex history and the ambivalence of human rights instruments,
it is not accurate to speak, as many often do, of the rule of law and
human rights as synonymous concepts.
In the end, despite some convergences, the rule of law remains
sufficiently distinctive from human rights, conceptually and
practically. The human rights discourse remains a language of
counter-hegemonic resistance, or even social emancipation, easily
appropriated by myriad forms of popular struggles around the
world, or a language of hegemony and discipline, a fagade that hides
the agendas of powerful elites. The rule of law discourse has neither
such linkage with popular politics, nor sufficient distance from the
agendas of the powerful. The centrality of the rule of law in the
1990s has more to do with a focus on security issues in peace
agreements and the development discourse's new emphasis on
institutions, rather than to its convergence with human rights.

64. For a discussion of the concept of Rechtstaat, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 193-204 (1960).

65. UDHR, supra note 62, pmbl.
66. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 25, art. 2 (referring to "legislative
or other measures").
67. See, e.g., ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 81.
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III. RULE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS OF COHERENCE

The idea that law matters for economic performance has been
around for a long time. At least since the late nineteenth century,
and certainly since Max Weber, the German contribution to this
idea has been central.68 Weber stressed that the rise of modern
capitalism was intimately linked to the rise of a particular form of
law that he called "formal rationality."69 He discussed this notion of
ideal-type formal rationality in the context of his well-known
discussion about the bureaucracy. 0 This Weberian insight lies at
the core of today's prescriptions for rule of law reforms as the
prerequisite for economic development. Whatever the rule of law
may have meant in German legal thought or in Weber's writings,
that concept has come to mean something much narrower and more
technical in the economic discourse emanating from development
institutions, such as the World Bank,7 ' as well as in the influential
writings of Hernando De Soto." Under this much narrower
definition, the rule of law has come to mean simply those institutions that are important for the creation and operation of an idealtype free market and nothing more. Prescriptively, this means that
rule of law rhetoric in economic development usually focuses on the
creation of "clear" property and contract rights,73 on formal law and
formalization of informal or social norms,7 4 and on the centrality of
the judiciary as a dispute resolution mechanism which will apply
rules mechanically and without discretion, creating predictability
for economic actors.7" It is not concerned with the distributional
68. David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIs. L. REV.
720, 720-21, 752.
69. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIETY 655-58,

1209-10 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968).
70. See id. at 217-23.
71. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENTREPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 87-97
(1996) [hereinafter FROM PLAN TO MARKET]. For a more recent and nuanced example that
shows the influence of the new institutional economics literature, see BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 52, at 3-4.
72. See generally DE SOTO, supra note 53.
73. See FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 71, at 87-90.
74. See DE SOTO, supra note 53, at 174-78; BUILDING INSTITUTIONS, supranote 52, at 171.
75. See BUILDING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 52, at 117-19. For an example of the interest
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outcomes of the market itself, which it leaves to other domains,
such as politics, to be dealt with. The rule of law then becomes, as
David Kennedy has noted, a substitute for development rather than
a means leading to it.76 Nor is it concerned with the idea that the
rule of law might mean something more than a tool kit for
marketization.77 I would suggest that this definition of the rule of
law in the context of development raises serious problems of
coherence and may hide contradictions between development and
security or human rights agendas themselves.
This could be illustrated by taking the dominant prescriptive
strands of development policy on the rule of law. First, the emphasis on "clear" property and contract rights sounds intuitively good.
But this easy consensus hides the discomforting fact that "clear"
property rights-in the sense of clear rights to exclude for
example-may not be needed for fast economic development. The
economic record of China is certainly not attributable to "clear"
property rights, and yet, it is hailed as an economic miracle due to
its record-setting rates of growth.7 8 At the micro level, there is

increasing evidence that vigorous markets in areas like housing and
land are possible even in the absence of clear, rigid, and formal
property rights.79 Indeed, creating too many clear and rigid property
rights may even impede the growth of markets, especially in
contexts of economic transition.8 0 Also, the emphasis on "clear"
property rights hides the question of distributional consequencesin other words, who should benefit or lose from the new and "clear"
property rights. From a security and human rights perspective,
among economists about the role of courts, see, for example, Simeon Djankov et al., Courts,
118 Q. J. ECON. 453, 454-57 (2003).
76. See DAVID KENNEDY, The Rule of Law as a Strategy for Economic Development, in
THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE 151-53 (2004).
77. See id. at 155.
78. See Harry Williams, Property Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village
Enterprises in China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY J. 227, 239-40 (2001).
79. See generally Omar Razzaz, Land Disputes in the Absence of Ownership Rights:
Insights from Jordan, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (Edesio Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998); Mona Fawaz, Strategizing for
Housing: An Investigation of the Production and Regulation of Low-Income Housing in the
Suburbs of Beirut (unpublished dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file
with author).
80. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1998).
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these are key questions. A property rights regime that ends up
concentrating land or other productive assets in the hands of a
minority, especially if that minority is from a different ethnic,
racial, or religious group, may very well alter the character of the
state itself and lead to violent responses or discriminatory policies."s
In a post-conflict situation, a rigid approach to property rights may
also end up preventing a new government from pursuing effective
policies for reconciliation and even reparation through effective land
reform, as happened in South Africa.8 2
A response to this critique may be that development institutions,
such as the World Bank, are prevented from prescribing policies
that touch upon political considerations," and that distributional
questions are the domain of domestic politics. Such a response
would not be convincing in the final analysis for at least two
reasons. First, in legal literature, questions of distribution have
been long recognized as central to the efficient-and not just
fair--operation of a market economy in the West.84 This makes
questions of distribution intrinsically important for achieving
effective pro-growth policies, and not merely as an afterthought or
charity. Second, external actors, including development actors,
cannot take the position that they are not responsible for the social
impacts of market-related policies such as the push for "clear"
81. For a provocative argument that such violent responses have happened with
alarming regularity when free market policies have been simultaneously introduced with
democratization as joint recipes for political and economic transition, see AMY CHUA, WORLD
ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL
INSTABILITY 259-61 (2003).
82. For an early warning, see S.B.O. GUTTO, PROPERTY AND LAND REFORM:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES (1995).
83. This argument has been a standard response by the World Bank's legal counsel over
several decades, based on the prohibition contained in Article 4 of its Articles of Agreement.
See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement art. 4,
§ 10, Feb. 16, 1989. But the World Bank is increasingly adopting frameworks of analysis that
openly acknowledge and advocate political and institutional changes as key prerequisites of
reform in many areas. For example, the World Bank has advocated a significant role of the
state to secure socially desirable land use, especially in post-conflict settings. See KLAUS
DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 178-84 (2003). It is not
clear if this new turn to politics means that the World Bank has abandoned strict compliance
with Article 4 of its Articles of Agreement, or whether it is simply a sign of plural voices
within a large and complex bureaucracy.
84. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Possession us. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea
of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1987).
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property rights, if such policies undermine security or human
rights. Rwanda and the Balkans, for example, are well-known
examples where unwise macroeconomic policies significantly
contributed to ethnic violence and state failure. 5 This raises
important questions about the accountability and responsibility of
external actors for their policies within developing countries or
countries in so-called transition.
A second prescriptive strand of rule of law strategies in development policy focuses on formal rules as the core of the rule of law. 8
Despite the obvious appeal of thinking of formal rules as superior
to informal rules-they are written, known in advance, capable of
being understood more precisely, and therefore lead to greater
predictability in economic exchanges, etc.-the formalization focus
seems misplaced or ideological for several reasons. First, it has long
been recognized in legal thought, at least since the legal realist
school of the early twentieth century, that the legal system is not a
complete regime of formal norms, but allows the interplay of
informal norms in ordering social relations including in the
economic sphere.8 7 In private law adjudication of torts, contracts,
and property, this phenomenon is rampant and manifests itself
in many ways, including through the distinction between rules
and standards. 8 Given this, the advocacy of a purely formal law
approach has a kind of Alice-in-Wonderland feel to it. Second, the
advocacy of formal law implicitly-and often explicitly-equates
informality with illegality, and advocates the replacement of illegal,
informal norms with formal, legal norms, a line of argument
famously popularized by Hernando De Soto.89 This argument
completely overlooks a very rich literature on informal norms and
institutions in socio-legal studies and legal anthropology on legal
85. See Regine Andersen, How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the
Conflict in Rwanda, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 441, 445-47 (2000); Anne Orford, Locating the
International:Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J.
443, 451-52 (1997).
86. See ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 119.
87. Id. at 77-79.
88. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1705-10 (1976). This distinction is also recognized by legal scholars writing in
different legal traditions including law and economics. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand
Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1988).
89. DE SOTO, supra note 53, at 161-71.
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pluralism, which has long documented the coexistence of multiple
legal and normative orders in which the statist, formal legal order
is only one of many.9" In addition, more recent research has also
begun to make problematic the neat distinction between the
state/law/formal versus non-state/illegallinformal dichotomy.91
Instead, this literature has posited that legal and illegal norms and
institutions are often deeply intertwined with each other, in a
process wherein one could see the state as very much involved in
the production of illegality while illegal norms and processes shape
the very structures of the state itself.9 2 This focus on what has been
called the "empirical state," a view that attempts to see states
'from below' and 'from within' as much as 'from above,"'9 3 makes
problematic the typical understanding of the illegal and informal as
deviant behaviors that will eventually be replaced by state law,
while avoiding the romanticism of informal legal orders that are
sometimes typical of the legal pluralism literature.
The third strand of rule of law strategies in development policy
focuses on the judiciary and imagines adjudication as a mechanical
exercise wherein typical bureaucratic discretion is eliminated. In
this approach the rule of law is idealized as a relief from rentseeking activities of the executive or the interest-group balancing
of the legislative branches.9 4 It also pictures the judiciary purely as
a dispute resolution mechanism, although, in reality, perhaps only
in commercial cases.9 5 This image of the judiciary dominates much
of the current literature, for example in law and economics.96 This
90. See, e.g., Lauren Benton, Beyond Legal Pluralism:Towards a New Approach to Law
in the Informal Sector, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 223, 223-42 (1994); Boaventura De Sousa
Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in
Pasagada,12 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 5, 89-90 (1977); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 L.
& Soc. REV. 869, 872-74 (1988); Razzaz, supra note 79, at 85.
91. See Edesio Fernandes & Ann Varley, Law, the City and Citizenship in Developing
Countries:An Introduction,in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 79, at 3-5; Josiah McC. Heyman
& Alan Smart, States and Illegal Practices:An Overview, in STATES AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES
11-17 (1999).
92. See Heyman & Smart, supra note 91, at 14-15.
93. See id. at 15.
94. See Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1-11 (1998).
95. See id. at 1-2.
96. See generally id. (discussing the legal reforms necessary for a modern nation to
prosper economically).
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emphasis on the mechanical nature of judicial processes also often
leads to the advocacy of simple formal norms, resting on the idea
that complex norms may call for complex judicial techniques such
as interest balancing or efficiency analysis that judges in poor
countries may lack the competency to perform.9 7 The mechanical
nature of adjudication has little to do with the nature of the legal
system itself-for example, common law or civil law-which may in
fact differ less than is commonly assumed."8 Many of these beliefs
seem to overlook elementary lessons of legal thought while
sometimes asserting highly contradictory ideas. The mechanical
image of the judge certainly cannot be squared with the knowledge,
shared by almost all legal thinkers, that rules are always incomplete, inconsistent, and ambiguous, and that the role of the judge is
to resolve this through a process of interpretation. Legal realists
argued that the law-politics distinction gets blurred in this process
of interpretation, while the critical legal theorists have argued
that judicial reasoning may show a bias or ideology that may
systematically lead to domination by elites.9" Liberals like Ronald
Dworkin see judicial interpretation as leading to the introduction
of principles to fill gaps and resolve conflicts between the rules
themselves.' ° Early American legal thinkers from Karl Llewellyn
to Oliver Wendell Holmes, who espoused the sociological jurisprudence method, would not have shared this mechanical view of the
judge's role. 1 1 Even modern law and economics could be said to
share a very pragmatic orientation to adjudication, in its call to
judges to look outside the law-though only to economics-to find
solutions to legal problems. °2 In fact, emerging literature in
economics is itself beginning to cast doubts on whether the
introduction of formal norms and a mechanical judiciary is actually
leading to economically efficient outcomes.' 3
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. See Martin Shapiro, The Success of JudicialReview, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193 (Sally J. Kenney et al. eds., 1999).
99. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: (FIN DE SI9CLE) 228-30 (1997).
100. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 56 (1986). Admittedly this interpretation is
aimed to produce what Dworkin calls "coherence."
101. See KENNEDY, supra note 99, at 82.
102. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 387-88 (1990).
103. See Djankov et al., supra note 75, at 453-511.
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It is clear that this idealized-and ideologized-image of the rule
of law does not lead to development, even if narrowly conceived as
economic growth. But it has problematic implications for human
rights and security as well. A narrow conception of the judge, for
example, often leads to arguments by scholars like Richard Posner
that human rights laws should not be introduced in developing
countries if economic growth is to be favored." °4 Indeed, a call for
the rule of law in the context of plural legal orders is often a call for
the assertion of the superiority of state law over non-state law,
through the coercive power of the state to achieve particular
outcomes that favor some. This can be seen in the advocacy to
override customary property rights with "registered land titles" in
countries like Kenya, for example," 5 which may create problems
from a security or human rights perspective in post-conflict or
transitional contexts. Finally, as I have argued above"0 6 and
elsewhere, 10 7 the human rights discourse has a political and
counter-hegemonic function that makes it much more critical than
the development discourse. The rule of law discourse will not easily
replace it for this very reason. Thus, the call for the rule of law
discourse is a call to use state law to prefer some methods and
consequences relating to development, human rights, and security,
and must not be interpreted as a call to respect human rights.
Rather, there needs to be a more critical evaluation of the uses of
the rule of law in particular contexts.
IV. RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY: PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY
As was explained earlier, the concept of international security
has fundamentally changed in recent years: the former state-based,
territorial notion of security has now been supplanted by a more
comprehensive notion of security.' The 2004 report of the High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, created by the
104. See Posner, supra note 94, at 3.
105. For a detailed analysis, see Joel M. Ngugi, Re-examining the Role of PrivateProperty

in Market Democracies:ProblematicIdeologicalIssues Raised by Land Registration,25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 467, 490-95 (2004).
106. See supra Part I.
107. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 12, at 245-53.
108. See supra Part I.
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U.N. Secretary-General, describes this as follows: "Any event or
process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances
and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system
is a threat to international security."' 9 It then goes on to include six
clusters of threats within this definition: environmental and social
threats including poverty, infectious disease, and environmental
degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil
war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological,
chemical, and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational
organized crime." 0 With this holistic approach, the report joins a
chorus of calls to expand the narrow definition of state security to
include environmental security and human security."' Indeed, the
National Security Strategy of the United States makes this linkage
between poverty and security quite clear and asserts that poverty
can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug
cartels within its borders." 2 With this move, poverty itself becomes
a security threat, so that the means of responding to it become more
militarized. Poverty alleviation-through the Millennium Development Goals, for example-becomes a means of addressing a security
threat, as opposed to a set of tools that are required either because
of moral duties towards the poor or because of a broad-based
economic development strategy." 3 Ergo, a logical conclusion from
this new approach would be that military interventions to secure
development goals or to deal with environmental catastrophes
would be legitimate and perhaps even lawful. This is not a fanciful
line of thinking: one could recall the important, perhaps unwitting,
role that the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report played in
supporting the neoconservative argument for the Iraq war, by
pointing to the role of gender inequality and poverty in Arab
109. A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 25.
110. Id.
111. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 47, at 4.
112. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 21.
113. Indeed, this could be said to be one of the weaknesses of the U.N. report on the
Millennium Development Goals, to the extent that the report advocates what could be
termed as a "Washington Consensus Plus" approach to poverty alleviation rather than
encouraging plural paths of economic development. See MILLENNIUM PROJECT, REPORT TO
THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: PRACTICAL PLANS TO ACHIEVE
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 8-10 (2005).
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"backwardness.""' The timing of that report did not hurt the broad
U.S. agenda of modernizing the Middle East by force. Rather, it
helped generate a hegemonic consensus that forcible intervention
was for the good of the Arab people. Of course, human rights-based
arguments have been used many times by hegemonic states to
justify their interventions, in the form of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.11 Human rights groups such as Human Rights
Watch were similarly inadvertent allies of the Iraq war effort by
refusing to evaluate the legality of the war effort itself, while
highlighting the terrible human rights record of the Iraqi regime," 6
thereby bolstering the argument of the war hawks that the use of
force was justified against the Baghdad dictator. Similarly, the
aftermath of the Asian tsunami in early 2005 saw a tremendous
level of military intervention and jockeying between states that
were eager to show how capable their respective military forces
were in responding to natural disasters." 7 This "securitization of
everything" is in this sense not new, though it is the first time that
a U.N.-appointed panel is endorsing such a broad definition. What
does one make of this move, and how is this related to the rule of
law?
One could begin by noting that the term "rule of law" is not used
in the High Level Panel report itself. The sections which seem most
pertinent to the issue in the report concern Parts 3 and 4, which
deal, inter alia, with the role of the Security Council."' Here, the
report firmly supports the view that the Security Council must
be the sole authority to authorize the use of force, in cases which
fall outside the purview of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.1 9 This
114. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2002). For a
commentary, see Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Arabs at the Crossroads,N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2002, at A23.
115. See, e.g., FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRYINTO LAwAND

MORALITY 175-79 (1997).
116. See, e.g., Justice For Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper (Human Rights
Watch, 2002), available at http://www.hrw.orglbackgrounder/mena/iraql217bg.htm.
117. One writer referred to this as "competitive compassion" between aid-giving nations.
See P.S. Suryanarayana, InternationalSolidarity, FRONTLINE, Jan. 15, 2005, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2202/stories/20050128006312400.htm.
118. See A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 59-92.
119. See U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1 (describing the meaning of and process for the
exercise of the right of self-defense for nation-states).
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commitment to multilateralism is coupled with an acknowledgement that the Council needs to be reformed, and with two proposed
models for change in the membership of the Council. 2 ° While this
commitment to seek structural change in the way the current
international order is managed is to be welcomed, the report is
silent on the question of the Council's compliance with international
law, and only refers to the Council's lack of accountability through
the rather weak call for "civil society engagement."'' Similarly,
though the report recognizes that the "war on terrorism" within
many countries has itself emerged as a major threat to human
rights and the rule of law,'2 2 it offers no concrete recommendations
for making the war on terrorism conform to human rights or the
rule of law. The Secretary-General's own report, which builds on
the High Level Panel report, continues in the same vein, by failing
to address the Security Council's own history of noncompliance with
human rights standards, or about the problematic aspects of the
"war on terror."'2 3 The Security Council's record since the end of the
Cold War has raised problematic questions about its commitment
to human rights, ranging from policy failures-such as the failure
to take action in specific human rights crises' 2 4 -to active collaborations in human rights violations by imposing economic sanctions
that lead to large numbers of deaths, providing the cover of
legitimacy to wars of aggression. The key problem here arises from
the fact that the Secretary-General uses the term "rule of law" to
mean many things, including multilateralism, a commitment to the
U.N. Charter, and human rights principles. While this maximalist
approach to the meaning of rule of law may be, and indeed is,
laudable, the Security Council will find it almost impossible to
comply with such an expanded notion of the rule of law in its own
actions, at least as judged by its past record. In addition, the
implications of a broad approach to defining security are not readily
apparent, especially relating to the role of the Security Council.
Would the Council be expected to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See A More Secure World, supra note 1, at 79-81.
See id. at 83.
Id. at 48.
See In Larger Freedom, supra note 1.
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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Charter to end massive human insecurity of any kind, including
those caused by poverty or natural disasters? That seems unlikely
and even unwise, as it would multiply the grounds-and pretexts-for use of force in international relations at a time of
hegemonic relations between states.
These two related failures-the failure to critically focus on the
Security Council and the failure to critically evaluate the "war
against terrorism"-are in fact very much interrelated. They
undermine the whole attempt to articulate a broad notion of
security as it raises concerns that an unaccountable Security
Council, even if it is expanded numerically, may turn out to flout
human rights and the rule of law in the name of responding to
myriad non-traditional threats. It also raises important questions
of legitimacy of Security Council actions under Chapters VI and/or
VII of the U.N. Charter to pursue rule of law programs in peace
operations, when the Council itself overlooks the rule of law in its
own functioning. The U.N. Secretary General in fact sees this
connection quite clearly. In his speech at the opening of the 59th
session of the General Assembly in 2004, Kofi Annan stated: 'Those
who seek to bestow legitimacy must themselves embody it; and
those who invoke international law must themselves submit to
it."'2 5 He further added that "[e]very nation that proclaims the rule
of law at home must respect it abroad; and every nation that insists
on it abroad must enforce it at home."'2 6 These Delphic pronouncements point to an important truth: that the absence of the rule of
law-however one may define it-in domestic contexts has to be
linked with the absence of the rule of law at the international level.
This absence of the rule of law is not merely evidenced by the more
obvious example of the U.S. decision to side-step the Security
Council in its war against Iraq. More problematically, it relates to
the actions of the Security Council itself as it authorizes what many
consider to be arbitrary, if not unlawful actions through its counterterrorism committee, created under Security Council Resolution
1373.127 Many of its actions arguably flout basic protections ex
125. Press Release, The Secretary-General, Rule of Law at Risk Around the World, Says
Secretary-General in Address to General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9491 (Sept. 21, 2004).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HEAR No EVIL, SEE No EVIL: THE U.N. SECURITY
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tended under human rights treaties and available under customary
international law, such as the presumption of innocence, the right
to confront one's accusers, and even the right to a remedy, which
are not automatically available under the Council's procedures. The
perceived absence of the rule of law-especially in its expanded
meaning that includes human rights-in the actions of the Security
Council makes it more difficult to advance those notions within
domestic contexts, especially through peace operations authorized
by the Council itself. This "legitimacy deficit" is compounded by a
gathering sense that for all the talk about "comprehensive security"
in the High Level Panel report, it remains overwhelmingly focused
on the idea that the proper response to terrorism consists of
rebuilding and strengthening so-called weak or failed states.12 8 In
this new world of strong states, softer goals such as development,
environmental protection, and human rights are likely to take a
backseat, while nation-building strategies are likely to focus on the
imposition of order from the outside,12 9 evoking concerns about the
return of formal colonialism. Such an externally driven approach is
unlikely to elicit much concern for the rule of law, however
narrowly or broadly it is defined. These concerns, which matter for
the legitimacy of the rule of law in the domain of security, need to
be addressed much more robustly.

COUNCIL'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM

EFFORT 4-7 (2004). For a review of some of the problems of legitimacy and the level of
contention at the Security Council, see generally Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Security Council's War
on Terrorism:Problems and Policy Options, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
BYMEMBER STATES (Erika de Wet & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 2003); Edward Luck, Tackling
Terrorism, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WARTO THE 21ST CENTURY 85,93-

98 (David M. Malone ed., 2004).
128. This is not surprising since the discourse of failed or weak states had already
emerged as part of the mainstream policy and legal discourse in the 1990s and the link
between weak states and U.S. national security had been well recognized. For a critical
review of the failed states idea, see generally Ruth Gordon, SavingFailedStates: Sometimes
a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 903 (1997). On weak states and U.S.
national security, see generally JEREMY WEINSTEIN ETAL., CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEv., ON THE
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2004),

available at

http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/FullReport.pdf.
129. See NECLA TSCHIRGI, INT'L PEACEACAD., POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING REVISITED:
ACHIEVEMENTS, LIMITATIONS, CHALLENGES 16-18 (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http:/www.

ipacademy.org/pdfs/POSTCONFLICTPEACEBUILDING.pdf.
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CONCLUSION

The discourses of security, development, and human rights have
gradually merged. The key challenges to security are now seen to
come not from invading armadas of strong states but from wellorganized groups of transnationally linked terrorists who operate
in "failed" or weak states that are unable or unwilling to stop them.
Security is also now more broadly conceived to mean human and
state security. Development challenges are currently thought to
arise from the absence of viable state institutions including a
judiciary and formal laws that protect property and contracts.
Human rights challenges are also increasingly seen as particularly
acute in situations where states have failed or are too weak to stop
massive abuses. There is, in other words, a consensus that state
failure or failure of governance is the root of all the problems in
these disparate areas of security, development, and human rights.
This consensus has in turn led to a focus on the rule of law as a way
of rebuilding or strengthening the state. But using the rule of law
as a way to build up states will not resolve the tensions between the
disparate agendas of development, security, and human rights
themselves. It is not argued here that the rule of law is a pernicious
idea or a Trojan horse. Effective governance of any society cannot
rest on any basis other than law. But the term "rule of law" is
currently capable of just too many disparate meanings depending
on the international policy agenda in which it is invoked.
The invocation of the rule of law will be of limited relevance if
there are conflicts between the agendas themselves-that is,
between human rights and development or between human rights
and security-and will not resolve fundamental contradictions
between these various agendas. The current discourse, reflected in
the High Level Panel report and the Secretary-General's reports, is
remarkably conflict-free and assumes a harmonious and mutually
reinforcing relationship between development, human rights, and
security. This assumption is unwarranted, and even perhaps
ideological. Promoting the rule of law as part of disparate policy
agendas also creates uncertainty in terms of the outcomes of
programmatic approaches-in other words, it is not clear who will
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be the losers and who will be the beneficiaries as a result of the
implementation of these various policy agendas. A commitment to
the formalization of informal property may mean, for example, that
foreign investors are able to buy more land in an urban area and
local entrepreneurs are bought out. This may indeed be the outcome
that a particular society and government desires to achieve. But it
does not help to camouflage that outcome in the language of the
rule of law as though the outcome is justified by the very rationality
and objectivity of the law itself.
Neither does a commitment to the rule of law as a way to rebuild
or strengthen the state answer the question of how large or small
the state needs to be. Nor does it resolve the question of whether
the state needs to be strong in some areas while weak in others.
The answers to these questions are likely to vary dramatically
depending on the local/national contexts and the particular policy
components of the agendas themselves. Finally, the commitment to
establish the rule of law within failed states will be fundamentally
undermined if the international rule of law is not given greater
consideration, especially where rule of law programs are pursued
through peace operations authorized by the Security Council. It is
most unfortunate that the recent flood of U.N. reports does not deal
with this issue with the seriousness it requires.

